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The global economic crisis, which has hit the international community
since 2008, has once again pointed at the limits of financial liberalization,
often perceived and described as a model excessively fostering financial
services and organizing financial instability by unbundling financial flows.'
Meanwhile, the continuous improvement of computing technologies and the
increased interconnectedness of regional and global financial markets have
given a significant boost to a financial services industry increasingly
operating as an autonomous economic sector on a worldwide and borderless
basis.
In reality, financial services providers have become key economic actors
on a worldwide scale. Whereas financial services and financiers merely used
to play a trade support role when trade was about goods rather than services,
they have vastly increased their influence and reach over time in dealing
with, nowadays, traditional activities such as banking, financing, insurance,
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securities, and pensions. In recent times, they have also given the masses
simple yet powerful tools to manage their transactions, investments, and
diverse financial operations through innovative channels without the
constraints once imposed by the traditional banking system and at a lesser
cost.
This evolution in the financial industry is, however, raising various
concerns at the global level because, as a result of their influential,
algorithmic, electronic, reactive, and borderless nature, new generations of
financial services tend to gain influence towards markets and/or disrupt the
established order without necessarily being bound by the financial sector
regulations.2 Hence, to what extent is the international community capable
of encouraging and coordinating the development of future, inevitable, and
borderless financial services?
The main, current debates on financial regulation are rather pessimistic.
Historically, financial services were hardly considered a regulatory concern.
The Bretton Woods negotiations which led to the creation of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the current World Bank,
essentially insisted on reconstruction and recovery after WWII but placed
no emphasis on the liberalization of trade exchange or on financial
facilitation.3 In time, nonetheless, the immense liberalization of
international trade, which occurred primarily as a result of the GATT/
WTO, has eventually led to a tremendous rise in the level of goods traded.
This, in turn, has increased the need for cross-border transactions as well as
the need to rely on more efficient financial services on a cross-border basis.
Later on, the increasing opening of financial markets and the large increase
in the commodities trade eventually transformed international finance into a
self-standing activity and industry acting both autonomously and
distinctively from palpable trade.4
Today, the large autonomy and influence enjoyed by financial services
providers is generating important debates. For instance, OECD research
highlights that the notion of "financial integration," i.e. the convergence of
financial activities within important financial conglomerates, forces
regulators to adapt to new forms of financing mechanisms and services.5
Similarly, the FSB, which is responsible for coordinating national financial
authorities and international standard-setting bodies whilst monitoring and
making recommendations about the global financial system, has raised
concerns about the so-called "Shadow-Banking" or "market-based
2. Res. Rep. on Fin. Tech. (Fintech), IOSCO 74 (Feb. 2017), https://goo.gl/yqqUql.
3. Reza Moghadam & Sean Hagan, The Fund's Role Regarding Cross-Border Capital Flows,
INT'L MONETARY FuND 3 (Nov. 15, 2010), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/
111510.pdf.
4. See Martin & Mercurio, supra note 1, § 2.3
5. See Harold D. Skipper, Jr., Fin. Services Integration Worldwide: Promises and Pitfalls, OECD
13 (2001), https://goo.gl/faOp7O.
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financing" industry,6 and warned about the systemic risks created by credit
intermediation practices involving entities, named as "other financial
intermediaries" (OFIs), outside of the regular regulated banking system.7
Very recently in January 2017, the FSB formulated additional concerns as to
the potentially negative impacts of technology-based financial services, the
so-called "FinTech" services, which have increasingly gained influence as a
result of modern technological performances and developmentss, and
recommended that the subject matter be integrated into the G20 Agenda for
further surveillance.9
In pointing at such concerns, these international institutions clearly
indicate that the international community is lagging behind technology and
financial services providers, both in terms of knowledge, policymaking, and
regulation.o This discourse characterized by a financial, instability-focused
mind-set, however, reveals another important trend. To the OECD,
financial services policymaking primarily is about ensuring the safety of the
financial system." To the FSB, financial services policymaking over the past
years has achieved great success, particularly in terms of reforming the
global financial system to mitigate vulnerabilities, to consolidate financial
infrastructures, to reinforce bank solvability through higher capitalization,
and to reduce the effects of interbank exposure.12 At the European Union
(EU) level, financial policymaking has consisted of setting up a framework
6. For a definition of shadow banking, see Laura E. Kodres, What Is Shadow Banking?, INT'L
MONETARY FuND 42-43 (June 2013), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/06/
basics.htm ("Many financial institutions that act like banks are not supervised like banks. If it
looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and acts like a duck, then it is a duck-or so the saying
goes. But what about an institution that looks like a bank and acts like a bank? Often it is not a
bank-it is a shadow bank.").
7. See Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2015, FiN. STABILYTY BOARD (Nov. 12, 2015),
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/global-shadow-banling-monitoring-report-2015.pdf.
8. Douglas Arner et al., The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?, UNSW Law
(Oct. 1 2015), https://goo.gl/DM3sY9.
9. Adding Fintechs to the 2017 G20 Agenda, the FSB particularly considered how FinTech
developments are affecting the global financial system in January 2017. See Mark Carney, The
Promise ofFinTech - Something New Under the Sun?, BANIC OF ENGLAND (Jan. 25, 2017), https://
goo.gldXG5KO. For comments, see also Caroline Binham & Claire Jones, Fintechs Warned to
Expect Tougher Regulation, FiN. TIMEs (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/6e2bd98c-
e32a- 1e6-8405-9e5580d6e5fb?mhq5j=E1.
10. Res. Rep. on Fin. Tech. (Fintech), supra note 2, at 75 ("It is clear ... that, taken together, the
changes already underway as a result of Fintech are substantial, in certain cases leading to
disintermediation and reintermediation, and in other cases testing the boundaries of full
disintermediation through the use of technology.").
11. Stephen Lumpkin, Supervision of Fin. Services in the OECD Area, OECD (2002), https://
goo.gl/CnDSeM ("A central goal in the design of regulatory and supervisory regimes for
financial services is to create a framework that ensures the safety of the financial system as a
whole and allows other objectives of supervision (e.g. investor and consumer protection) to be
attained efficiently and effectively.").
12. Letter from Mark Carney, FSB Chair, to G20 Leaders, Building a Resilient and Open
Global Fin. System to Support Sustainable Cross-Border Investment (Aug. 30, 2016) (on file
with Fin. Stability Board).
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guaranteeing "a resilient and stable" system through Basel I, II, m capital
and liquidity standards (2013), a Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD
IV) to be implemented by 2019, reforms to the securities and derivatives
market including the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR
2012), the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II), and
Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR) of 2014.13
In other words, the international community and its supervisory
institutions have over time considered the financial services industry as a risk
and have accordingly approached financial services policymaking in terms of
risk-mitigation.14 Yet, despite stability preservation policies being absolutely
necessary, one could argue that such orientations have had a major flaw. In
focusing attention exclusively on ways to regulate so as to control and
restrict, policymakers might have missed opportunities to look forward,
anticipate, and provide common directions ensuring the development,
promotion, and coordination of financial services evolving faster than
regulatory constraints.
Interestingly, various forward-looking initiatives have lately been
promoted on a domestic basis. In September 2016, the Hong Kong
Monetary Authority (HKMA) released a Fintech Supervisory Sandbox (FSS)
aimed "to facilitate the pilot trials of Fintech and other technology initiatives
of authorized institutions (Als) before they are launched on a fuller scale," as
well as a "Fintech Facilitation Office (FFO) to facilitate the healthy
development of the fintech ecosystem in Hong Kong and to promote Hong
Kong as a fintech hub in Asia."15 Later, the Hong Kong Financial Services
Development Council released a genuine business plan aimed at making
13. Financial Services Liberalization and TiSA: Implications for EU Free Trade Agreements, EUR.
PARLAMuIENT (July 26, 2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/
578019/EXPOSTU(2016)578019_EN.pdf.
14. This has particularly been noted by IMF and W%7TO experts. See Stijn Claessens & Juan A.
Marchetti, Global Banking Regroups, FiN. & DEV. 14, 16 (Dec. 16 2013), https://goo.gl/rM2JUQ
("The general regulatory reaction following the global financial crisis has been a mix of
nationally and internationally coordinated policies aimed at reducing the risk of cross-border
transmission of shocks and at dampening the effects of those shocks. These efforts include
improving the way regulators deal with troubled global institutions-whether estoring them to
health or guiding their unwinding process. New international standards for banks, such as
those requiring higher levels of capital and better liquidity management . . . [s]ome
improvements have been made with regard to information sharing across jurisdictions and
disclosure of financial exposures, possibly helping supervisory agencies detect risks earlier and
allowing for more market discipline. Assessments of systemically important financial systems
are conducted more frequently, and financial surveillance has been enhanced . . .").
15. See Letter from Arthur Yuen, Deputy Chief Executive, Hong Kong Monetary Authority,
to the Chief Executive, All Authorized Institutions (Sept. 6, 2016), https://goo.gl/TPxj9e. See
also Fintech Facilitation Office (FFO), HONG KONG MONETARY AUTHORITY, https://goo.gl/
QDJidQ; See also Michelle Chen & Michelle Price, Hong Kong to Launch Banking Fintech
'Sandbox' as Rivals Pull Ahead, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2016), http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-
hongkong-banks-regulator-idUKKCN11COEV (Hong Kong's top banking regulator
announcing that "The sandbox allows banks to conduct tastings and trials of newly developed
technology on a pilot basis. Within the sandbox, banks can try out their new fintech products
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Hong Kong a leading FinTch place.16 In line with the initiative, the
Monetary Authority of Singapore launched a "FinTech Regulatory Sandbox"
aimed to "encourag[e] more FinTech experimentation so that promising
innovations can be tested in the market and have a chance for wider
adoption,"17 while the Central Bank of Malaysia also set up a "'Financial
Technology Regulatory Sandbox Framework" for similar purposes.'s
Finally, in December 2016, the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (ASIC) launched a FinTech regulatory sandbox also for similar
purposes.19
Despite such unilateral efforts, however, no large-scale framework capable
of foreseeing, facilitating, and coordinating the inevitable future
developments of the financial services sector was ever put into place. Some
rule-making attempts have been made but overall, the various pro-
liberalization efforts aimed at opening and fostering cross-border financial
services markets have yielded little results. Instead, the economic skepticism
mentioned previously has had an echo in the trade community where, as
explained below, financial services facilitation has not been a general
priority.
This article explores this aspect of large-scale financial services
regulation-i.e. the absence of moving-forward and anticipation-driven
policymaking and rulemaking. It does so essentially by explaining decades of
financial services negotiations, by clarifying the current status of global
financial services efforts, and finally, by assessing to what extent the current
trade system will be able to coordinate the future cross-border development
needs of the financial services industry.
So far, however, the article finds that in the case of financial services
markets, no "basic social rule" reflecting a global alignment in beliefs,
norms, and institutions and capable of promoting cross-border financial
services facilitation and coordination was ever agreed upon.20 Despite
modem regional mega trade agreements suggesting a fairly recent regional
convergence on the matter, the international community does not have the
premises of a reliable global legal framework for future financial services
without the need to achieve full compliance with the HKMA's usual supervisory
requirements").
16. Antoine P. Martin, "HKDC's Report on 'The Future of Fintech in Hong Kong': A business plan
for making Hong Kong a financial services hub!", THE ASIA-PAciFIc CIRCLE (June 7, 2017), https:/
/www.asiapacificcircle.org/single-post/2017/06/07/HKFSDC-Report-on-The-Future-of-Fin
tech-in-Hong-Kong-from-financial-services-policy-to-fintech-hub-business-plan.
17. See MAS FinTech Regulatory Sandbox, MONETARY AUTHORTY OF SING. (last modified
Mar. 13, 2017), https://goo.gl/aqYkzi.
18. See Bank Negara Malaysia, Financial Technology Regulatory Sandbox Framework, Press
Release No. 10/16/05 of 18 Oct. 2016, https://goo.gl/qlAY6e.
19. Launch of an Innovative Regulatory Sandbox for Fintech, THE TREASURY AUSTRAIAN GOVT
(Dec. 15, 2016), https://goo.gUOdu6Lf; see also Australia's FinTech Priorities THE TREASURY
AuSTRAIAN GOVT https://goo.gl/FDef9N (last visited June 21, 2017).
20. On the "basic social rule" argument, see Arnold S. Kling, Specialization and Trade: a Re-
Introduction to Economics, 91-96 (Cato Institute 2016).
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development, anticipation, and coordination. Hence, it thus seems unable to
look forward and benefit from the progression of new technology-based
financial services. In reality, although numerous negotiations on financial
services market-opening have taken place since the 1990s under the World
Trade Organization (WTO) through the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) and its Annex on Financial ServiceS21 or more recently, on a
bilateral and plurilateral basis, the rules for cross-border global financial
services facilitation coordination are at a rudimental stage because global
policy and rule-making have never been a drive. The reason for this is
simple: trade in financial services facilitation has always been a highly
contradictory process, which stands on unsteady legs from an economic
perspective and has been largely driven by detrimental politics rather than
by a financial liberalization policymaking and rule-making agenda.
In comparison with other areas of international economic law, such as
investment or trade, legal publications on global financial services facilitation
are rather uncommon. With limited large-scale liberalization efforts since
the GATS financial services negotiations, research on financial liberalization
commitments has mostly produced economic, domestic, GATS-focused, and
unspecific multi-sector comments.22 An article by Gkoutzinis, published in
The International Lawyer in the mid-2000s, explored the impact of GATS
negotiations in terms of legal commitments in the banking sector and drew
interesting conclusions as to the difficulty of conciliating financial openness
with national regulatory priorities.23 Otherwise, the possibility of
anticipating financial services developments has not attracted much
attention, and the literature lacks a comprehensive discussion as to why no
global policy or legal framework for cross-border trade in financial services
facilitation and coordination was ever set up, until now. The issue is
21. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167
(1994) [hereinafter GATS]; see also Annex on Financial Services, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://
goo.gl/v27weo (last visited June 25, 2017).
22. See Stephen L. Harris, The Politics of Financial Services Liberalization: The Case of the
Canadian Investment Dealer Industry, 26 POLICY STUD.J. 526, 526 (1998); Jonathan E. Leightner
& C.A. Knox Lovell, The Impact of Financial Liberalization on the Performance of Thai Banks, 50 J.
EcON Bus. 115, 115-17, 124, 127 (1998); Adolfo Barajas et al., The Impact of Liberalization and
Foreign Investment in Colombia's Financial Sector, ?63 J. DEV. EcON. 157, 157-58 (2000); Ali
Ataullah et al., Financial Liberalization and Bank Efficiency: A Comparative Analysis of India and
Pakistan, 36 APPL. EcoN. 1915, 1915-16, 1922-24 (2004);Jonathan Williams & Nghia Nguyen,
Financial Liberalization, Crisis, and Restructuring: A Comparative Study of Bank Performance and
Bank Governance in South East Asia, 29 J. BANKING & FIN. 2119, 2119-22 (2005); Emilia
Bonaccorsi di Patti, Daniel & C. Hardy, Financial Sector Liberalization, Bank Privatization, and
Efficiency: Evidence from Pakistan, 29 J. BANKING & FIN. 2381, 2381-83 (2005); S.M.
Thangavelu, & Mun-Heng Toh, Bilateral 'WTO-Plus' Free Trade Agreements: The WTO Trade
Policy Review of Singapore 2004, 28 WORLD ECONOrY 1211, 1211 (2005).
23. Apostolos Gkoutzinis, International Trade in Banking Services and the Role of the WTO:
Discussing the Legal Framework and Policy Objectives of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
and the Current State of Play in the Doha Round of Trade Negotiations, ?39 INT'L LAWYER 877,
877-91 (2005).
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important, nonetheless, because constructive orientations and forward-
looking policy and rulemaking will be increasingly needed in order to
coordinate inevitable cross-border financial services developments, beyond
purely protective policymaking.
The argument formulated in this paper is chronological, interdisciplinary,
and topical. Chronological, because the research process examines the
various debates which have taken place since the early 1990s to identify the
issues which appeared important over time and to draw a map of the
understanding of the financial liberalization framework as of today.
Interdisciplinary, because it derives from varied economic and scarcely legal
literature on the topic, as well as from various reports and working papers
published by international organizations. Finally, the argument is topical
because the results of the research have been organized by distinguishing
four main trends detailed below.
Section One reminds us that financial services liberalization never reached
a consensus on the economic side of things. On the contrary, liberalization
has historically been defended and attacked on economic grounds. If the
opening of financial services markets was promoted during the 1990s for its
competition, price, and growth benefits, experts would have also warned
against the instability created by market-opening initiatives in times of crisis,
particularly in countries with structurally weak financial sectors. Hence,
while many comments have raised skepticism, coordination dynamics have
progressively faded. Section Two shows that multilateral negotiations under
the WTO's GATS have had limited law-making impacts because financial
services negotiations have been dominated by political agendas and have
become a leveraging tool to obtain concessions on other matters. They were
not, however, motivated by global financial services coordination
motivations. Hence, important ideological divides remain. Section Three
considers the failure of preferential negotiations to yield results in terms of
large-scale "global" coordination despite a praised EU model, and modern
policy dynamics possibly offering some solutions. Section Four finishes with
the idea that, as a result, the global regulatory and coordination framework
now lags behind with little large-scale coordination perspectives, particularly
in light of current policy shifts in the United States. While the financial
services sector is rapidly expanding, as of 2017, preferential policymaking
related to investment, competition, or financial services has become a
political embarrassment worldwide. Financial liberalization and the very idea
of facilitating cross-border financial services have become a sensible,
worrisome, and politically incorrect topic and more than a coordination
objective for the future.
I. No Consensus on the Economics of Financial Liberalization
The first element suggesting the unlikeliness of a global financial services
facilitation and coordination framework is there was never a consensus on
whether such efforts were valuable. Liberalization experts considered the
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idea extensively beginning in the 1990s because the banking sector's
important development could then foster growth (A). In the 2000s,
however, financial liberalization became a concern (B).
A. MARKET-OPENING FOR GROWTH IN THE 1990s
Discussions on financial services liberalization started in the 1990s with
the idea that facilitating global trade in goods also required facilitating
financial flows and trade in financial services. While finance used to be
about cash flows supporting trade in goods, financial services progressively
became a global industry per se, deemed capable of contributing to global
growth if regulatory barriers were reduced.24 At the time, the idea
particularly echoed with ongoing multilateral efforts to foster services
liberalization under GATS, and experts began assessing the potential
contribution of liberal, open, and competitive financial services markets to
the global economy by discussing economic doctrines ranging from Adam
Smith to modern OECD. Some described financial liberalization and
market openness as enabling governments, companies, and households to
find necessary funding through international markets.25 Others labeled the
global financial system as a "public good" in which government intervention
had a role to play26 and emphasized the system's limits (influence on
domestic markets, taxation competition, or the surrendering of sovereignty,
macroeconomic, and capital markets policymaking powers), thus leading to
the idea of creating a framework "for a stable and sustainable growth of the
international financial market."27
By the end of the decade, a financial crisis hit Asia and liberalization was
associated with harmful deregulation. Stiglitz insisted that states had a
supervisory role to play towards financial markets' failures.28 Others noted
that loosening the global financial landscape would create inconsistencies
and a continuous necessity to consolidate global, regional, and domestic
24. International banking has grown twice as fast as world trade between the 1970s and the
1990s. See Jeffrey Simser, CATS and Financial Services: Redefining Borders, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L.
33, 34 (1996). On the relationship between goods and financial services, see Joel P. Trachtman,
Trade in Financial Services under GATS, NAFIA and the EC: A Regulatory Jurisdiction Analysis 34
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 41-2 (1996). On the role of financial intermediation towards the
economy in general, see Kling, supra note 20, at 103-117.
25. See Dennis P. Quinn & Carla Inclan, The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current
and Capital Account Liberalization, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 771, 772-73 (1997). See also Masuni
Kishi, Regulation Issues in the Era of Financial Liberalisation: Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 7 J. OF
ASIAN ECON. 487, 499 (1996); see also Aaditya Mattoo, Financial Services and the WTO:
Liberalization Commitments of the Developing and Transition Economies, WORLD BANK (Aug.
1998), https://goo.gl/85AkBU; See also Trachtman, supra note 24, at 40.
26. Kishi, supra note 25, at 488.
27. Jackline Wahba & Mahmoud Mohieldin, Liberalizing Trade in Financial Services: The
Uruguay Round and the Arab Countries 26 WORLD DEv. 1331, 1343 (1998).
28. Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Role of the State in Financial Markets, in Proceedings of the World Bank
Annual Conference on Development Economics 19, 27, 32, 50 (M. Bruno & B. Pleskovic ed., 1994).
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financial systems.29 Local actors in countries with weak financial services
sectors would not be able to adapt to market-opening measures, external
financial liberalization, while the premature opening of domestic capital
markets would generate risky bubbles-i.e. uncontrollable volatile financial
flows, excessive, and unforeseen appreciations and depreciations in exchange
rates on a short-term basis.30
In other words, discourses on the benefits of financial liberalization shifted
to concerns on future financial instability while financial liberalization
reforms were criticized for assimilating countries into a global pattern.3' A
"sequencing" doctrine eventually took over by the end of the 1990s. To
avoid the damaging impacts of "unrestrained" liberalization, financial
markets liberalization were operated in phases: internal market preparation
to increased competition, external trade liberalization policymaking,
financial liberalization, and ultimately, the opening of the capital account
which corresponds to the decision of the host authorities to allow the free
circulation of capital inside and outside domestic economies.32
B. DEREGULATION QUESTIONED IN THE 2000s
Such questioning accelerated in the 2000s.33 Certainly, some insisted that
financial liberalization and the rejection of state interventionism were
essential to fostering foreign investment in services and global growth.34 In a
definite political approach, the former Canadian Deputy Minister of Finance
Dobson, for instance, insisted that scheduled financial services liberalization
under multilateral negotiations would "promote a country's growth and
welfare in two main ways:" by guaranteeing a legal framework favorable to
"foreign institutions investing for the long term," and by encouraging
transparency and reform through external pressure.35 The argument, also,
29. Kishi, supra note 25, at 488-92.
30. See Wahba & Mohieldin, supra note 27, at 1341-43. See also Apisith J. Sutham, The Asian
Financial Crisis and the Deregulation and Liberalization of Thailand's Financial Services Sector:
Barbarians at the Gate, 2 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1890, 1890-92 (1997).
31. Sutham, supra note 30, at 1893.
32. Wahba & Mohieldin, supra note 27, at 1339-40; see also The IMF's Approach to Capital
Account Liberalization, 9 (Int'l Monetary Fund 2005). On calls for prudential regulation, see also
Stiglitz, supra note 28, at 19; see also Kishi, supra note 25, at 499; see also Simser, supra note 24, at
57.
33. See Robert M. Townsend & Kenichi Ueda, Welfare Gains from Financial Liberalisation, 51(3)
INr. EcON. REv, pp.5 5 3- 59 7 (Aug. 2010); see also Christopher F. Thornberg and Frances L.
Edwards, Failure of Trade Liberalisation: A Study of the GATS Negotiations, 10 J. INT'L Bus. & L.,
pp.3 2 5-3 48 (2011); see also Piez, Laura. GATS Financial Services Liberalisation: How do OECD
Members Schedules Impact Commercial Banking FDI?, 42(6) J. WORLD TRADE, pp.106 5-1083
(2008).
34. Ayesha Malik, Why 'Trade' in Financial Services, An Assessment of the Agreement on Trade in
Financial Services Under the GATS. 1 J. WORLD INv. 35, 362 (2000); see also World Investment
Report, UNCTAD (2015), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir20l5_en.pdf.
35. See Wendy Dobson, Further Financial Services Liberalization in the Doha Round? Ir'L
EcoN. POL'Y BRIEFs (Aug. 2002), https://goo.gl/4u3UYr. See also Aaditya Mattoo et al.,
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was that increasing trade in financial services would reinforce the financial
sector and benefit consumers.36
Skepticism nonetheless prevailed. Following the Asian Crisis of 1997,
Stiglitz reiterated that "financial and capital market liberalization, done
hurriedly, without first putting into place an effective regulatory framework,
was at the core of the problem."37 Furthermore, the idea emerged that
financial liberalization was not a model needed and demanded by all. Taking
the example of India and China, where the crisis was said to have little
impact because strong capital controls had actually been put into place,
economists argued that many countries ill-equipped to adapt abrupt market-
opening policies had never asked for such policies in the first place.38
Arestis, alternatively, furthered the economic inadequacy argument by
questioning the "problematic nature of the theoretical framework of
financial liberalization" and dissected the assumptions on which financial
liberalization was always based-for instance, the ideas that free banking
leads to stability of the financial system, financial liberalization enhances
economic growth, or stock markets and speculation cannot influence
international financial stability.
All in all, while market-opening was desirable in the early 1990s, it was
widely admitted in the 2000s that markets were perhaps more instable than
the risks of governmental interference itself, and a new claim was formulated
that better regulation was more important than facilitation coordination.39
Measuring Services Trade Liberalization and Its Impact on Economic Growth: An Illustration, 21 J. OF
EcoN. INTEGRATION 64, 66 (2006).
36. See James Gillespie, Financial Services Liberalization in the World Trade Organization 1-4
(Harvard Law School, Working Paper, 2000) (Describing financial services as "facilitators of
transactions" and noting that "efficient financial services are vital to the functioning of modem
industrial economies. They provide intermediation between lenders and borrowers, allow firms
to diversify and manage risk, ration capital across the economy, and provide many of the
technical services necessary for both domestic and international commerce to operate. In
countries with weak economies, the development of a strong financial sector is now recognized
as one of the key ingredients to sustainable development."). See also Philip Arestis, Washington
Consensus and Financial Liberalization, 27 J. PosT KEYNEsIAN EcON. 251, 256 (2004).
37. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth, and Instability, 28
WORLD DEv. 1075, 1075 (2000). It was added that cross-border trade commitments would
particularly increase capital flow risks and currency valuation bubbles while interventionism
would provide a safeguard against financial liberalization spillovers. See Nico Valckx, WTO
Financial Services Liberalization: Measurement, Choice and Impact on Financial Stability, 1 (De
Nederlandsche Bank, Research Memorandum No, 705, 2002). See also Dobson, supra note 35,
at 3-4. (admitting that the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 provided the proof that "mobile
capital by itself can be dangerous" if free flows are left uncontrolled).
38. Stiglitz, supra note 37, at 1076-79.
39. Arestis, supra note 36, at 256-58; see also Malik, supra note 34, at 370; On "prudential
concerns," see Chantal Thomas, Globalization in Financial Services - What Role for GATS? 21
ANN. REv. BANKING L. 323, 331 (2002); Mattoo, supra note 25, at 4.
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H1. GATS: Vastly Political Negotiations, No Rule-Making
Agenda
In addition to a lack of consensus on the economic side of things, the
financial services liberalization negotiations, under the premises of the
WTO's GATS, hardly succeeded in creating a global market-opening
facilitation coordination framework. The negotiations of various
multilateral liberalization instruments proved to be extremely difficult
because self-interest and lack of commitment constantly prevailed over
global policymaking opportunities and rule-making agendas (A). As a result,
the draft framework for the coordination of financial services market-
opening efforts became legally complex, weak, and structurally contradictory
(B), while important political divides barred policy and regulatory results
(C).
A. GATS: COMPLEX AND DETACHED NEGOTIATIONS
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which created the
existing framework applicable to trade in services, was inspired from the
multilateral rules applicable to trade in goods under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).- In addition, the GATS Annex on Financial
Services, which has since then remained the only multilateral reference, was
timidly negotiated at the end of the WTO Uruguay Round (1993).41 A
Decision on Financial Services gave the Members additional time to
"improve, modify, or withdraw all or part of their commitments in this
sector without offering compensation"42 while OECD Members undertook a
complementary but optional initiative known as "The Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services."43 A Second Annex on Financial
40. Including transparency obligations, Most-Favoured Nations (MFN) rules and market
access. See R. Brian Woodrow, The 1997 World Trade Organization Accord on Financial Services:
Its Impact on and Implications for the World Insurance Industry, 25 THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK
& INs. 78, 89 (2000). See also Gkoutzinis, supra note 23, at 890; Trachtman, supra note 24, at 41.
41. The Annex also recognized the necessity of leaving the activities of central banks unbound
(Paragraph 1) and gave host governments an opportunity to conduct domestic policies for
prudential reasons, i.e. for the protection of the stability of domestic financial systems
(Paragraph 2). Annex on Financial Services, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/
tratope/serv._e/10-anfin.e.htm (last visited June 25, 2017).
42. Decision on Financial Services, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://goo.gl/2NAu3q (last visited
June 25, 2017).
43. See Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://
goo.gl/PcpH8E (last visited June 25, 2017). OECD documentation suggests that while the legal
status of this Understanding is "unclear," its goal at the minimum was to offer an optional
'alternative approach' to scheduling commitments and to set certain explicit standards for
liberalization of financial services, particularly in relation to monopolies, government
procurement, new financial services, rights of establishment, the temporary entry of personnel,
cross-border trade, non-discrimination and national treatment. See The General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS): An Analysis, OECD (1994), https://goo.gl/qUTJkMP. See also
Gkoutzinis, supra note 23, at 901.
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Services eventually gave Members extra negotiation time,-* but remained on
the side. A First Protocol to the GATS, also known as "The Interim
Agreement," and a Second Protocol were furthermore discussed in 1995
with twenty-nine countries, the EU negotiating as one, and in 1996 to
acknowledge the need for even more negotiations.45 Three additional
protocols later, the final Financial Services Agreement (FSA) concluded in
December 1997 to ensure that a new set of fifty-six schedules of
commitments and a list of exemptions representing the position of seventy
WTO Members would update and replace the existing framework.46
At best, however, the length of the negotiations, the large amount of
instruments produced, and their limited legal contribution, mainly time
extensions, suggest that the Members were inefficient. In reality, the
Members were unwilling to achieve results in terms of coordination,
framework creation, or global rule making, and rather focused on self-
interested, irreconcilable, and impassionate, detached talks. For instance,
the First Protocol negotiations were dominated by the US and EU agenda,
which aimed at obtaining strong market access commitments from other
Members-i.e. developing economies. However, while the EU was willing
to accept weak commitments, the US feared the emergence of "MFN free
riders"-i.e. countries committing to weak obligations but requesting the
benefit of strong commitments granted to other members under the MFN
rules-and requested strong binding commitments.47 Because of the
emerging economies' reluctance to play the reciprocity card, the US
withdrew MFN standards from its financial services commitments48 and,
together with India and Thailand, blocked or delayed negotiations until the
44. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): An Analysis, supra note 43, at 25-26.
45. Negotiations would not conflict with GATS or prevent new commitments applicable on a
MFN basis as part of GATS. Members considered the right to establish and provide new
financial services abroad, commitments towards adverse measures, the granting of access to
payment and clearing systems to foreign entities on a National Treatment basis, but apart from
monopolies left the extent to which they were willing to liberalize financial services undefined.
On the negotiations roadmap, see Simser, supra note 24, at 58-59; Gkoutzinis, supra note 23, at
891. See also Second Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, WORLD TRADE ORG.
(July 24, 1995), https://goo.gl/r504b0.
46. Fifth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Dec. 3,
1997), https://goo.gl/SnwZpK On the negotiations, see Overview of the 1995 and 1997
Negotiations on Financial Services, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://goo.gl/oMzkd2 (last visited June
25, 2017). See also Ying Qian, Financial Services Liberalization and GATS - Analysis of the
Commitments Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GALS) at the World Trade
Organization (WTO), (Asian Development Bank, Background Paper 4, 2003); see also
Gkoutzinis, supra note 23, at 890.
47. The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis Vol. 1959 (Patrick F. J.
Macrory et al. eds., 2007); see also Thornberg & Edwards, supra note 33, at 338-40 (On
"Strategic Free Riding").
48. See Dobson, supra note 35, at 1.
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Fifth Protocol,49 assuming that better results would be achieved through
bilateral negotiations.
Beyond regulatory control and framework-building considerations,
furthermore, financial negotiations were essentially about influence building.
For instance, commentators largely emphasized that liberalization efforts
occurring prior to the Asian financial crisis had been made by developing
economies with weak financial systems which clearly had "little to gain from
reciprocal access to the OECD economies, [] [but] were anxious to signal
their commitment to reform as a way to restore tattered credibility."50 In
fact, economic research on the motivational determinants of financial
liberalization suggested that in a trade context characterized by deadlocked
agricultural negotiations under the Doha Round,s1 financial sector
negotiations had essentially represented a "valuable bargaining chip" to
developing economies with agricultural or textile agendas involved in multi-
sector negotiations.52 Simply put, Members, who had no financial services
export goals, either made financial liberalization efforts to obtain
concessions from others regarding what mattered to them, or promised that
they would do so in the future to obtain immediate or future concessions.ss
In other words, liberalization talks were hardly grounded on optimistically
liberal beliefs, but resulted from a mix of political trading by developing
economies and political pressure applied by developed economies seeking to
expand the reach of their financial services providers abroad.
B. GATS DID LITTLE ON FINANCIAL SERVICEs RULE-MAKING
Due to political un-commitment, many structural barriers were never
addressed, and the GATS framework was criticized as "far from offering
optimal results" and for "do[ing] little to advance international trade in
banking services despite the broad participation and resources available to
it."54 The framework was overall deemed insufficient for three reasons. Two
were legal, the other was political.
49. See Simser, supra note 24, at 60; Trachtman, supra note 24, at 8-9; Thomas, supra note 39,
at 327; Gkoutzinis, supra note 23, at 891.
50. Dobson, supra note 35, at 6.
51. Antoine Martin & Bryan Mercurio, "Doha dead and buried in Nairobi: lessons for the WTO",
Journal of Int'l Trade Law and Policy, Vol. 16 Issue: 1, pp.4 9 -6 6 (2017), https://doi.org/
10.1108/JITLP-01-2017-0001.
52. See Philipp Harms et al., Explaining Liberalization Commitments in Financial Services Trade,
139 REv. WORLD ECON. 82, 102-03 (2003). See also Edward D. Mansfield & Eric Reinhardt,
Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of
Preferential Trading Arrangements, 57 ITr'L ORG. FOUNDATION 829, 829-30 (2003) (On PTAs
bargaining leverage to some states having no reasons to negotiate preferential agreements
during multilateral rounds). On the peer group effect, see also Valckx, supra note 37, at 9.
53. Harms et al., supra note 52, at 85; Mattoo, supra note 25, at 19.
54. Gkoutzinis, supra note 23, at 908; see also Piez, supra note 33, at 1065; Piritta Sorsa, The
GATS Agreement on Financial Services - A Modest Start to Multilateral Liberalization,
(International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 7, 1997) (discussing the GATS failing "to meet
many of the . . . tests for a 'good' agreement"); see also Bernard Hoekman, Tentative First Steps -
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First, the GATS and its Annex were unable to create genuine legal
commitments and rules on financial services because the objective of
liberalizing services progressively only created ambiguity. The GATS'
drafters provided the Members with four channels for liberalizing the cross-
border supply of services (Mode 1),55 facilitating services consumption
abroad (Mode 2),56 increasing internal liberalization through commercial
presence (Mode 3)57-i.e. facilitating foreign investment-and facilitating
the movements of foreign persons inside domestic markets (Mode 4).58
Whilst these provided a method for .planning and organizing general
market opening,59 the Modes created a hybrid and dysfunctional system. In
the main, the Agreement liberalized specifically listed markets-the so-
called "positive list" approach-and guaranteed MFN treatment (no
discrimination amongst foreign providers), and transparency requirements
on these listed sectors.60 However, the negotiating parties would retain the
possibility to establish a list of reservations to these commitments and to
limit National Treatment (no discrimination between domestic and foreign
providers) and Market Access standards.61 Hence, by tempering with its own
partial "positive list approach" to ensure progressivity, the general GATS
framework created total or partial exemptions to its parties' commitments
and generated its own loopholes. Legally speaking, the multi-sector
Agreement was described as a very conditional or limited,62 discretional,
complex, and fragmented63 set of instruments characterized by a major legal
"structural weakness,"- a "juxtaposition of texts," and a disruptive "lack of
An Assessment of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Services 14 (The World Bank, Policy Research
Working Paper 1455, 1995) ("liberalization in the sense of reducing discrimination and
enhancing market access did not occur"); Drusilla K Brown et al., The Liberalization of Services
Trade: Potential Impacts in the Aftermath of the Uruguay Round, in The Uruguay Round and the
Developing Countries 292 (Will Martin & Alan Winters eds., 1996).
55. GATS, supra note 21, at 285-86 (discussing cross-border supply).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.; on liberalization modes, see Sorsa, supra note 54, at 7; Simser, supra note 24, at 48;
Mattoo, supra note 25, at 2-3.
59. On Modes, see Simon Lester et al., World Trade Law, Text, Materials and Commentary 638-
39 (2012).
60. GATS, supra note 21, at 286-87.
61. Id., at 297-98; see Dominique Servais & Julie Dutry, GATS 2000: High Stakes for the
Financial Sector 6 ITr'L Bus. L. J. 653, 655-56 (1999); see also Bernard Hoekman, Assessing the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, in The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries 98
(Will Martin & Alan Winters ed., 1996). See also Thomas, supra note 39, at 329; Qian, supra
note 46, at 5, 10.
62. Sorsa, supra note 54, at 7.
63. Simser, supra note 24, at 56.
64. Pierre Sauv6, Assessing the General Agreement in Trade in Services: Half-Full or Half-Empty?,
29 J. WORLD TRADE 125, 132 (1995) ("Such structural weakness is nowhere more visible than
in the GATS' approach to liberalization commitments."); Sirnser, supra note 24, at 50;
Hoekman, supra note 61, at 98; Servais, supra note 61, at 657; Gillespie, supra note 36, at 14; see
also Martin Roy, et al., Services Liberalization in the New Generation of Preferential Trade
Agreements (PTAs): How Much Further than the GATS? 6 WORLD TRADE REv. 155, 165 (2007);
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coherence," thus, making it impossible to understand precisely the
Members' commitments and obligations.65 Even more bluntly, the GATS
ensured the preservation of the status quo66 and was deemed largely
counterproductive because its progressive nature overall created partially
liberalized markets while leaving non-scheduled sectors out of reach.67
This major weakness particularly impacted financial services facilitation
and coordination efforts, and a major ideological gap appeared. In
retrospect, negotiations on financial services were not obvious to many
countries which traditionally relied on trade in goods and faced regional
financial instabilities at the time of the negotiations. To these, trade in
services-including financial services-was unreachable while market-
opening requests were interpreted as the 'foreign domination of the banking
or general financial system .. .'68 Thus, the MFN commitments-a right to
non-discrimination amongst foreign providers-deemed applicable to all
Sherry M. Stephenson, Regional Versus Multilateral Liberalization of Services, 1 WORLD TRADE
REv. 187, 189-91 (2002); Thomas, supra note 39, at 323-25.
65. One commentator wrote: "[e]ach Member first decides (negotiates) which service sectors
will be subject to these disciplines. It then decides, for each such sector, what measures will be
kept in place that violate market access or national treatment ... With four modes of supply,
there are eight opportunities for GATS Members to avoid full application of market access or
national treatment," see Hoekman, supra note 61, at 98, 116; see also Thomas, supra note 39, at
330; Servais, supra note 61, at 660-63 (for a similar reading of the GATS functioning). See also
R6gis Bismuth, Financial Sector Regulation and Financial Services Liberalization at the Crossroads:
The Relevance of International Financial Standards in WTO Law, 44 J. WORLD TRADE 490, 498
(2010) ("on the obscure and vague provisions of the legal framework for the liberalization of
financial services.").
66. Stephenson, supra note 64, at 192 ("Viewed primarily as an exercise in binding the 'status
quo' . . . in national schedules, the GATS has not so far been able to advance the trading
community towards real market opening in services."); see also Hoekman, supra note 61, at 101.
67. Rudolf Adlung & Hamid Mamdouh, How to Design Trade Agreements in Services: Top Down
or Bottom Up? 2-3 (World Trade Organization, Working Paper, 2013), https://goo.gl/9xP3Sq
("As a result, access to any particular service sector, if subjected to specific commitments, is
defined by eight parameters, specifying the levels of market access and national treatment for
each of the four modes of supply. These structural innovations absorbed a lot of negotiating
energy. Little time and resources were thus left in the Uruguay Round to achieve actual
liberalization within the newly created framework and, given the novelty of the terms and
concepts involved, there might also have been limited appetite to do so in many cases. The
levels of openness ultimately bound in the resulting schedules thus remained quite shallow
overall."); see also Bryan Mercurio, ASEAN Services Liberalization Beyond 2015, Assessment and
Recommendations USAID (Mar. 2016), https://goo.gl/y0351F ("Not only have issues such as
subsidies, procurement and emergency safeguards been left for future negotiations, but the
agreement itself always envisaged initial market access and national treatment commitments to
be progressively liberalized. Understandably, the GATS differs from the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in a number of respects, most notably in architecture and the
variable geometry of commitments between and among Members ... the GATS is the result of
pragmatic negotiations which resulted in a rich set of rules but a lighter approach in regards to
commitments. There is much more work to be done.").
68. On financial services using economic development instead of contributing to it, see Wahba,
supra note 32, at 1333. On the role and impact of foreign commercial and investment banks
over domestic financial systems and monetary policies, see Simser, supra note 24, at 44-45;
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were considered excessive by developing economies which had no particular
interest in treating all foreigners equally69 while the National Treatment
standard-an obligation to treat foreigners as locals-became a leveraging
asset as it was only applicable to the extent that specific sectoral
commitments were taken. Thus, more than creating a global legal
framework for financial services liberalization, the GATS outputs produced a
quantity of exceptions and a large dose of optionality but failed to provide a
dynamic towards financial services facilitation coordination.70
Second, the reach of the Financial Services Annex was also described as
very limited. To Gillespie, including a large range of activities within the
description of 'financial services'71 was tactical: the greater the scope of the
agreement, the less chances that the negotiation would be captured by one of
the industries at risk to foreign competition.72 To others, the move diluted
the agreement and compromised transparency,73 while leading to the
conclusion that while providing liberalization opportunities, difficult
multilateral negotiations had created a 'vastly complicated' trading
environment for the further development of cross-border financial services.74
While OECD Members went 'beyond the general requirements of the
GATS' by adopting the optional 'Understanding on Financial Services,'75
elsewhere the results were less convincing. If developed economies planned
'more comprehensive cornitments,' developing ones rather focused on
licensing requirements and firms' legal structure constraints, thus, making
domestic preservation prevail over market opening.76 In addition, although
most signatories had committed towards the core sectors (insurance,
banking, and securities) in line with their existing domestic frameworks,
about eighty percent of exceptions were made in relation to further
development of banking and non-insurance sectors.77
Trachtman,supra note 24, at 48; Mattoo supra note 25, at 16, 19; Dobson, supra note 35, at 3-4;
Thomas, supra note 39, at 332; on self-interest in negotiations, see Simser, supra note 24, at 40.
69. The model was questioned after the US requested a broad exemption allowing it to deny
MFN status to countries taking insufficient liberalisation commitments. See Thomas, supra
note 39, at 329.
70. See Trachtman, supra note 24, at 44; supra note 24, at 359; Sorsa, supra note 54, at 5.
71. The definition of Financial Services is provided in Paragraph 5 of the Annex.
72. Gillespie, supra note 36, at 9.
73. See, e.g., Hoekman, supra note 61, at 110.
74. Wahba, supra note 32, at 1342.
75. Gillespie, supra note 36, at 11-12; Malik, supra note 34, at 365; Research conducted by the
Asian Development Bank, however, found that the 'economic intuition' had more advanced
economies that tended to take greater liberalization commitments that were not always
verified; see Qian, supra note 46, at 43, 49.
76. Gillespie, supra note 36, at 15-16; Qian, supra note 46, at 44.
77. It was also added that, all sectors considered, the majority of commitments were scheduled
in Mode 3- i.e. foreign commercial presence-while Mode 4 (free movement of personal)
remained 'insignificant,' see Gillespie, supra note 36, at 15-16. To others, however, the ability of
the GATS liberalization process to increase competition through Mode 3 was rather limited, see
Qian, supra note 46, at 44.
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Third, the commitments taken by the Members have been found
disappointing because they were more political than legal. In theory, about
two thirds of the WTO Members that participated in the Uruguay Round
made market access commitments on financial services, thus, ensuring that
ninety percent of global banking assets and stock market capitalization (as of
1994) would be involved in financial liberalization.78 An International
Monetary Fund working paper, however, added that the Agreement had
'only resulted in limited consolidation of [industrialized] existing policies'
because the Members which liberalized their markets did so for
'mercantilistic bargaining' reasons-i.e. to convince others of their liberal
state of mind-more than to earn economic benefits.79 Others went so far as
to ask whether the GATS efforts ever aimed at operating a legal structure or
were a mere political undertaking 'grounded in the politics of policy' and
characterized by important legal discretion.so At best, the value of the GATS
instruments was, thus, to be found in the political message that had been
sent to the world: more than building a legal framework for facilitation
coordination, the negotiations brought financial services into the scope of
global talks and, thus, represented a 'somewhat tentative and imperfect'81
'modest start' in paving the way for future sector developments.82
C. IMPORTANT POLITICAL DISAGREEMENTs REMAINED
Low policy and law-making motivations overall reflected important,
unsolved political disagreements. Of course, the argument was made that
given the technological progresses lowering the cost of financial services-
especially electronic payment and banking systems-it had become
increasingly important to focus on the competition policy in the financial
sector at the global level.83 Still, in reality the GATS instruments became a
multifaceted political problem.
First, the negotiation process created a major uncertainty feeling, both in
legal and political terms. Experts deplored 'notably inconclusive' efforts and
78. Sorsa, supra note 54, at 5, 12.
79. Id., at 6, 13; Mattoo (1998) supra note 25, at 2.
80. Malik, supra note 34, at 367-68; see also Dobson, supra note 35, at 4.
81. Sauv6, supra note 64, at 127.
82. See Mattoo (1998) supra note 25, at 12-16 (WTO commitments always were a way of
signaling the Members' strategic seriousness towards trade and investment but hardly prevented
status quo consolidation.). See also Simser, supra note 24, at 57, 65; Sorsa, supra note 54, at 4-5,
17. See also Wahba, supra note 32, at 1342; see also Woodrow, supra note 40, at 87 (On the idea
that negotiations were about bringing the idea of progressive financial liberalization more than
about creating a trade regulatory 'Big Bang'). See also Mercurio, supra note 67, at 4. ("To date,
there have not been any meaningful advances to the GATS ... leaving services 'with yesterday's
rulebook' of "weak, incomplete, rules and the limited, regulatory precaution-laden, pre-
Internet, commitments of 1994."). (citing Pierre Sauv6, Towards a Plurilateral Trade in Services
Agreement (TISA): Challenges and Prospects 5 J. OF INT'L COM., ECON. & POL'Y 1, 3 (2014).
83. Stijn Claessens, Regulatory reform and trade Liberalization in Financial Services, in DOMEsTIC
REGULATION ANID SERVICE TRADE LIBERALIZATION, 206 (Aaditya Mattoo & Pierre Sauv6 eds.,
2003).
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emphasized 'a certain lack of clarity about the significance of the GATS to
globalization in financial services',84 others criticized a 'loosely phrased,
multilateral agreement . . . acceded to by many countries without much
commitment' which had largely encouraged political games without
providing for actual financial sector and market opening improvements.
5s
Second, the fear of foreign banks influencing domestic markets created a.
reluctance issue and maintained ideological divides as to whether market-
opening was about sound harmonizing policymaking or regulatory
sovereignty and stability threats.86 To some, developed economies had to
make more efforts to refrain from protectionism.87 To others-such as
former Deputy Minister Dobson-resonate but nonetheless ambitious
liberalization would remain the key.88 Overall, high expectations were
therefore placed in the ability of the Doha Rounds to foster the financial
services liberalization political demarche, but conclusive agreements as to
the possibility to facilitate and coordinate cross-border financial services
were never reached. This was particularly well summarized by Gkoutzinis,
who at the time noted that as far as financial services were concerned, 'the
main objectives of the current Doha agenda [would] draw heavily on the
limitations and shortcomings of the 1997 Agreement' with expectations
focusing on developing countries broadening their commitments or on the
definition of prudential exceptions aimed at preserving financial stability89
IV. From Multilateral to Preferential Negotiations
Doha, however, failed to produce results90 and financial services
discussions shifted with the idea that 'preferential' arrangements and
regionalism would represent a political alternative to deadlocked WTO
negotiations incapable of solving agricultural disagreements. In practice,
however, (A) early preferential agreements had a defiance dimension rather
than a policy and rule-making role, and their impact on financial services
facilitation and coordination remained somehow limited (B) and despite a
European model (C) and modern agreements suggesting an apparent
84. Thomas, supra note 39, at 325.
85. Malik, supra note 34, at 375-77.
86. Gkoutzinis, supra note 23, at 911 ('The most obvious conclusion is that developed
countries are encouraging more market access and national treatment commitments, while
developing countries are still refusing to open their cards before other more pressing trade
disputes were settled.'); see also Malik, supra note 34, at 357-358, 369 and Gillespie, supra note
36, at 19; see also Dobson, supra note 35, at 4 ('The fundamental issue remains how to persuade
reluctant developing countries that opening their financial markets to foreign service providers
is in their long-term interest.').
87. See Harms et al., supra note 52, at 103.
88. Dobson, supra note 35, at 6-7, 8-10.
89. Gkoutzinis, supra note 23, at 911.
90. Antoine P. Martin & Bryan Mercurio, Doha Dead and Buried in Nairobi: Lessons for the
WTO. J. or INT'L TRADE LAW AND PoLIcY (Forthcoming 2017); Gkoutzinis, supra note 23, at
911.
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willingness to build policies and rules (D) preferentialism-because of its
very selective nature-has so far failed to generate consensus on financial
services facilitation and coordination.
A. EARLY PREFERENTIAL ARRANGEMENTS: POLITICS RATHER THAN
POLICY
The 2000s witnessed a significant proliferation in the number of
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs)-also known as Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs) or as Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)-aimed at
allowing more efficient negotiations amongst states sharing common
liberalization goals. In reality, these agreements were negotiated before and
in parallel to the creation of the VTO in 1995, but they never attracted
much attention since all eyes then focused on multilateral talks.91
Nonetheless, when the VTO called for increased multilateral negotiations
through the Hong Kong Declaration of 2005,92 preferential arrangements
had already become a serious alternative to the Doha Round deadlocks.93
In retrospect, the early preferential negotiations, however, brought little
to the financial services framework. Instead, they were criticized for
producing 'virtually no liberalisation'94 because most discussions focused on
embodying mid-1990s market access standards matching the GATS.
Preferential discussions rather had a largely political nature, far from the
idea of creating global policies and rules for coordinating financial services
cross-border developments.
First, preferential liberalization was an opportunity for developed
economies to take a stand against multilateral negotiations where trade in
goods (important to developing countries) dominated trade in services
(important to advanced economies). Under the VTO's Single Undertaking
(all or nothing) model, the Uruguay Round had difficulties to deliver in,
terms of services and, later, the Doha Round became an even bigger
complication as negotiations focused on agricultural subsidy issues while
occulting services negotiations.95 Furthermore, the limits of the GATS'
91. On the various waves of FTA negotiations in the late 1950s and 1990s, see Edward D.
Mansfield & Eric Reinhardt, Multilateral Determinants ofRegionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO
on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements, 57 INT'L ORG. 829, 831 (2003); see also
Olivier Cadota et al., Can bilateralism Ease the Pains ofMultilateral Trade Liberalization?, 45 EUR.
ECON. REv. 27, 27-28 (2001); on early FTAs, see generally Shujiro Urata, Globalization and the
Growth in Free Trade Agreements, 9 ASIA-PACIFIC REvIEw 20, 20-21 (2002).
92. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(05)/DEC (2005), https:/goo.glI/s8NrN9.
93. See Gkoutzinis, supra note 23, at 878. (Referring in the early 2000's to 'four main tracks of
institutional reform, not mutually exclusive, available to those countries that elected to open
their financial systems to international competition . . . the unilateral track.. . the bilateral track
. . . the multilateral regional track ... and the multilateral non-regional track of reform.').
94. Rudolf Adlung, Services Liberalization from a WTO/GATS Perspective: In Search of Volunteers
(World Trade Org., Econ. Research and Statistics Div., Working Paper 2009).
95. See also Antoine P. Martin & Bryan Mercurio, supra note 90. See also Roy, Marchetti, &
Lim, supra note 64, at 157. See also Gkoutzinis, supra note 23, at 911.
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positive list framework had given negotiators additional reasons to shift
strategies.96 Therefore, advanced economies interested in services
liberalization left multilateral talks and uncooperative countries to discuss
multisector liberalization arrangements, seen as 'an insurance against failing
multilateral one-sided negotiations'.97 In other words, comnitting to
bilateral and regional negotiations was about developing domestic services
on a self-interest basis by opening new markets-the 'Singapore Issues', i.e.
foreign investment, government procurement, competition or financial
services which were excluded from WTO talks during the Cancun
Ministerial Conference of 2004.98 The process was also about creating a
'defensive' and 'competitive' liberalization cycle: more than limiting
competition arising from non-negotiating countries, preferential deals would
defend domestic infant industries from free-riders aining to enjoy greater
market access without committing to open their own markets, protect
domestic investments abroad, and lock-in the investments originating from
selected partners.99 The countries which refused to negotiate on services,
however, were given no access to other markets.
Second, preferential liberalization took a strategic, regional, political, and
security perspective.100 Following the creation of the NAFTA Agreement in
1994, for instance, a 'new regionalism' doctrine described an 'ongoing
phenomenon of proliferation of bilateral and regional trading agreements in
96. As a reminder, the US had in the past interrupted negotiations because other countries
refused to make concessions on MFN matters. See Section 1.
97. Jo-Ann Crawford & Roberto V. Fiorentino, The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade
Agreements, WTO Discussion Paper No. 8, 6-9 (2005); Rahul Sen, "New Regionalism" in Asia: A
Comparative Analysis of Emerging Regional and Bilateral Trading Arrangements Involving ASEAN,
China and India, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 553, 565 (2006) (". . . it is believed that such economic
partnership agreements, that involve deeper liberalization beyond tariff reduction in goods, can
provide as a catalyst for enhancing the pace of multilateral trade liberalization.").
98. See Juan A. Marchetti & Martin Roy, Services Liberalization in the WTO and in PTAs, in
OPENING MARKETS FOR TRADE IN SERVICES: COUNTRIES AND SECTORS IN BILATERAL AND
WTO NEGOTIATIONS, 74 (Juan A. Marchetti & Martin Roy eds., 2008) ("The multifaceted
nature of trade in services has resulted in the inclusion of distinct but complementary sets of
disciplines to cater for the existence of, inter alia, several modes of supplying services as well as
complex sectoral issues (e.g. financial services and telecoms). Thus, in addition to a main
chapter on trade in services, PTAs also often include additional chapters on investment, the
movement of natural persons, financial services, and telecommunications, which either contain
specific obligations for those sectors or policy areas, or simply clarify the application of certain
disciplines to those sectors or policy areas.").
99. Marie-France Houde et al., The Interaction Between Investment and Services Chapters in
Selected Regional Trade Agreements, (OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 55, 2007), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/054761108710; see also Crawford, supra note 97, at 16; Mohamed R.
Hassanien, Bilateral WVTO-Plus Free Trade Agreements In The Middle East: A Case Study Of OFTA
In The Post-Trips Era, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L. J. 161, 161 (2007-2008) ("Free trade
agreements (FTAs) are no longer about trade."); Thangavelu & Toh, supra note 22, at 1218;
Sen, supra note 97, at 554; Aaditya Mattoo & Carsten Fink, Regional Agreements and Trade in
Services: Policy Issues, 16-19 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2852, 2002).
100. Sen, supra note 97, at 555; Crawford, supra note 97, at 1.
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the Asia-Pacific'-the ASEAN.101 Free-trade areas and customs unions also
appeared in Sub-Saharan Africa whilst consolidation initiatives were being
developed by numerous countries with the US or as regional policies in
South America and Eastern European countries where alignment policies
with the EU were set up to compensate the former Soviet Union's
fragmentation.102 In all cases, these 'additive regionalism' trends were clearly
generated by what commentators called a 'domino effect' generating
economic and political incentives to join a club and acting as a political
catalyst amongst like-minded countries whilst helping with the building of
diplomatic and security relations with foreign partners.103
Overall, early preferentialism as promoted by the US, the EU, and their
most liberal partners had limited impact in terms of financial services policy
and rule-making. Despite calls for financial services policymaking as part of
the Hong Kong Declaration,104 and even though the goals of negotiating
parties representing more than eighty percent of world trade in services was
to bypass uncooperative developing economies at the multilateral level, to
promote the interests of the largest economies, and to create a club centered
around liberal values at large,105 the process was certainly not about
negotiating a global framework for cross-border financial services
development and coordination deemed acceptable to all.
B. TitE EU MODEL AS A SUITABLE MODEL?
The European model should be mentioned here as, in fact, it has been
described in the literature as a regional model potentially suitable for larger
future financial services facilitation coordination. The model is twofold.
First, the EU model has a major community dimension. At the EU level,
the financial liberalization process has been described as a slow and steady
process spread over three decades and observing the sequencing rules
generally prescribed by economists on the matter, i.e. trade liberalization
followed by domestic reforms aimed at preparing domestic financial systems
to market opening, before actually opening the country's capital account.o6
This included banking regulation coordination based on a consensually
101. Sen, supra note 97, at 553.
102. On the WAEMVU, CEMAC, COMESA, SADC38 or COMECON initiatives, see
Crawford, supra note 97, at 6-9, 13.
103. Crawford, supra note 97, at 6 (taking the example of Chile, Mexico and Singapore); see also
Sen, supra note 97, at 554, 565.
104. See Thomas F Morante et al., Global Liberalization of Financial Services Through the
Evolution of Trade Agreements, 123 BANING L. J. 605, 626 (2006).
105. Such as Japan, India, China, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Mexico, India, Hong Kong,
Switzerland, Norway, Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, and Singapore. See Roy, Marchetti & Lim,
supra note 64, at 157, 184-85; see also Stephenson, supra note 64, at 187.
106. On sequencing and capital account opening, see The IMFs Approach to Capital Account
Liberalization, supra note 32, at 49, 75. For a definition of capital account opening, see M. Ayhan
Kose & Eswar Prasad, Capital Accounts: Liberalize or Not?, INT'L MONETARY FuND, https://
goo.gl/S20hkN ("The capital account in a country's balance of payments covers a variety of
financial flows-mainly foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio flows (including investment
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agreed minimum harmonization playing field under a 'lowest common
denominator' criterion, the mutual recognition of the applicable rules, and
the idea that domestic authorities would be responsible for supervising their
domestic financial institutions. o7 The EU members also coordinated the
opening of the financial sector to internal, single market competition
(through the limitation of administrative barriers restricting market access to
financial actors originating from the EU'o8) and the facilitation of capital
account transactions (including capital movements and foreign exchange
transactions).109 Hence, as of today, the free movement of people, goods,
services, and capital constitute the core 'four freedoms' at the basis of the
European Union's single market. It is said that 'the path adopted by the EU
represents the best case of successful extensive liberalization in the financial
services industry'.11o
Second, and as suggested previously, the EU model significantly
influenced the elaboration of financial services talks at various levels because
the Single Market-as a concrete ongoing reality-gave negotiators both an
example of existing developments and some influence as rule-makers."' The
GATS commitments by the EU reflected a status quo matching existing
Single Market rules;112 however, the Union's influence towards financial
services coordination has derived mostly from recent free trade agreement
negotiations.
Clearly, research conducted in 2003 suggested that attempts to increase
trade with the MENA region (the Euro-Mediterranean partnership)
generated limited results and, in fact, left financial services out of the
negotiations due to a lack of strong financial supervision in these
countries.113 Since then, nonetheless, additional negotiations have been
conducted, particularly with strategic partners and mainly in Asia.
The EU reports that in the negotiations conducted after 2006, in
particular, concessions exceeding GATS commitments have been achieved in
in equities), and bank borrowing-which have in common the acquisition of assets in one
country by residents of another.").
107. See also Paola Bongini, The EU Experience in Financial Services Liberalization: A Model for
GATS Negotiations? Vienna: SUERF (SUERF Studies: 2003/2), 14-16.
108. This was achieved through the First and Second Banking Coordination Directives (77/
780/EEC) and (89/646/EEC), which created a Single Passport allowing EU banks to establish
and supply financial services in EU member countries. In practice, however, the mapping of
banking markets showed a lack of homogeneity, with the UK and Luxembourg becoming far
more advanced financial hubs in the Union. See id. at 21-22.
109. Id. at 17.
110. Id. at 8.
111. Id. at 32-6 ('Third, the Single Market has represented a building bloc promoting
multilateral liberalization. In fact, those EU member states which had domestic pieces of
legislation less favorable to foreign non-EC intermediaries and initially bound their status quo,
were later prone to lift such burdens and relax some of the restriction introduced in the
schedules.').
112. Id. at 36.
113. Id. at 41.
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regards to market access and establishment rights (Mode 3 Commercial
Presence under GATS).114 In modem FTAs, in fact, important investment
provisions normally provided through bilateral investment treaties have even
been included, far ahead from GATS standards.115 The EU-Korea FTA,
which entered into force in July 2011, gave hope to EU financial services
providers regarding a very restricted Korean financial sector and has been
described by the EU as a 'new generation' agreement and as 'the most
significant new agreement since the WTO Uruguay Round,' possibly
exceeding the US-Korea (KORUS) FTA.16 Similarly, in November 2014,
the EU completed negotiations on a FTA with Singapore by representing
about one-third of EU-ASEAN trade in goods and services and about two-
thirds of EU-ASEAN investments,"o and by providing a framework on
modern issues such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures (Chapter 5), e-
commerce (Chapter 8), investment (Chapter 9), government procurement
(Chapter 10), or intellectual property (Chapter 11).118 In a very similar
fashion, FTA negotiations with Vietnam concluded in 2016.119 In both cases,
the text of the agreements is yet to be formally approved by the Commission
and ratified by the European Parliament, and the Financial Services
provisions are drafted as a subsection of the e-commerce chapter120-thus
not picturing financial services as an investment playground per se.121 In
both cases nonetheless, and in line with the mega-agreements in which the
EU is currently involved,122 the negotiations suggest that the EU is playing
an active role in pushing large-scale financial services facilitation and
coordination.
C. MODERN AGREEMENTS: A POLITICAL WILL TO LIBERALIZE
SELECTIVELY
In contrast with fairly inconclusive multilateral negotiations, the modem
trend towards mega-regional negotiations suggests increasing determination
114. Policy Department A for the Economic and MonetaryAffairs Committee, Financial Services
in EU Trade Agreements, POLICY DEPARTMENT, EuRoPEAN PARiAMENTr, 7, 10, IP/A/ECON/
2014-08 (Nov. 2014). To the exception of the EU-Chile Association Agreement of 2002.
115. Id. at 10-11.
116. The point is not explored further in this article. For an analysis, see id. at 10; see also
Financial Services Liberalization and TiSA: Implications for EU Free Trade Agreements, supra note
13, at 11.
117. See Countries and Regions: Singapore, EUROPEAN COMM'N, https://goo.gl/ftAABn (last
visited June 27, 2017).
118. See EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, EuRoPEAN COMM'N, https://goo.gl/uiCG8e (last
visited June 11, 2017). .
119. See EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, EuRoPEAN COMM'N, https://goo.gl/nEmr8M (last
visited June 11, 2017).
120. In contrast, the EU-East African Countries (EAC) FTA, which negotiations ended in
2014, contains no provisions on financial services, except those related to agricultural
developments, available at https://goo.gl/nGqcov.
121. In contrast with TPP for instance. See id.
122. See infra.
490 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
to building either domestic or selective frameworks for financial services
facilitation and coordination.
As mentioned in the introduction, various jurisdictions have taken pro-
services stands, particularly recently, in contrast with the general risk-averse
approach to financial services followed by financial stability-focused
regulators on a global scale. In the Asia-Pacific region, in particular, various
governments have set up pro-banking initiatives aimed at facilitating the
development of new Fintech services, with the aim of assessing potential
opportunities outside of the applicable domestic legal frameworks prior to
generalizing them.123 Since the beginning of the global economic crisis of
2008, furthermore, research suggests that, particularly in emerging market
economies, financial markets have been increasingly opened, with
restrictions on market access and discriminatory measures favoring domestic
financial services declining notably in relation to banking, securities, and
insurance activities.124
In addition, to a certain extent, recent preferential arrangements have
been found capable of increasing financial services' facilitation. In contrast
with GATS-type agreements, which merely provides lists of positive
commitments without creating a general liberalization scheme, recent
preferential arrangements with the US-or other developed economies
following a more liberal NAFTA-type negative approach to commitments-
have given signatories incentives to provide restriction-free liberalization
frameworks, which are narrowed down through a list of the sectors, or
measures that will not be liberalized immediately (these are "the non-
conforming measures").125 Therefore, in doing so, PTAs are endorsed for
having potentially achieved relatively "greater liberalization,"126 and for
contributing to the increasing transparency and foreign investment
diversification in the financial services sector.127
Interestingly, however, liberalization is not merely about unbundling and
authorizing unrestricted openness to cross-border financial services. To the
contrary, preferential agreements tend to provide significant market-access
safeguards. For instance, the "new financial services" provisions allow
foreign providers, originating from other signatories, to provide new
services. These are about preventing discrimination "in like circumstances"
but leave hosts some regulatory room. Furthermore, "new services" in all
123. See sources cited supra notes 15-18, for examples in Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and
Australia.
124. Claessens, supra note 14, at 15.
125. See for instance Stephenson, supra note 64, at 189, 193-195; see also Marchetti & Roy, supra
note 98, 74-5.
126. Roy et al., supra note 64, at 173-75, 179.
127. Morante et al., supra note 104, at 626; Stephenson, supra note 64, at 189; Adlung, supra
note 94, at 12; see also Houde et al., supra note 99, at 244.
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agreements can be subjected to authorization requirements, which
guarantees regulatory freedom in "prudential" situations.128
Hence, regional preferential arrangements, perceived as "WTO-plus"
instruments to complement WTO negotiations, have been described as a
part of a "competitive liberalization" process as well as a "building block for
multilateral liberalization."129 In fact, various large scale negotiations-
described as "mega-FTAs" because of their magnitude and geographic
reach30-point towards a political willingness to liberalize services, such as
financial services, on a large scale. This will occur throughout various
regions, mainly under US and EU leadership. In particular, examples of
"mega-FTAs" include the TPP agreement between the US and eleven
countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the TTIP between the US and the EU,
the CETA between the EU and Canada, and the TISA negotiations amongst
fifty countries, including the US and the EU.
1. TPP
Even though it is highly unlikely to enter into force following recent shifts
in US trade policy,131 the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is the most
obvious example of modem preferential agreements negotiated with a
genuine policy ambition shared amongst twelve countries.132
In line with most FTAs negotiated by the Office of the United States
Trade Representative (USTR),133 Chapter 11 of the TPP clearly aims to
facilitate market access to foreign financial service providers, to allow the
introduction of "new financial services" by these providers,134 and more
generally, to promote foreign investments in financial institutions and cross-
128. See, e.g., Trans-Pacific Partnership art. 11.7, Nov. 5, 2015, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/
files/TPP-Final-Text-Financial-Services.pdf; see also US-Australia Free Trade Agreement, art.
13.6, Mar. 2004, http://www.sice.oas.orgffPD/USA.AUS/Studies/AUSFfAguide-e.pdf; see
also US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement art. 10.6, Jan. 15, 2003, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/
files/uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/assetupload-file708_4036.pdf. On the issue of stability
safeguards in FTAs, see also Martin & Mercurio, supra note 90, at forthcoming.
129. Thangavelu & Toh, supra note 22, at 1217; see also Sen, supra note 97, at 566; Roy et al.,
supra note 64, at 174-75; On PTAs approach to investment; see Houde et al., supra note 99, at
245-46.
130. For further information about mega-agreements, see, e.g., Vinod K Aggarwal & Simon J.
Evenett, A Fragmenting Global Economy: A Weakened WTO, Mega FTAs, and Murky Protectionism,
19 Swiss POL. Sci. REv. 550, 550-55 (2013).
131. Letter from Maria L. Pagan, Acting Representative, Office of the United States Trade
Representative, to TPP Depositary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Jan. 30, 2017),
available at https://goo.gl/xVhCOj.
132. The twelve partner countries involved in the TPP include Australia, Brunei Darussalam,
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and
Vietnam. Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, N.Z. MINsISRY OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE,
https://goo.gl/QZ73X3.
133. Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements.
134. Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 128, at art. 11.7.
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border trade in financial services.135 It does so by granting service providers
the basic standards of international economic laws, such as national
treatment (the parties must treat national and foreign financial service
providers equally) and the most-favored-nation clause (the parties must reat
investors from all other partner countries equally).136 In addition, it creates
regulatory transparency obligations, and strong "[m]arket [a]ccess for
financial institutions" commitments. This implies that the parties cannot
limit the number of foreign financial institutions, and cannot impose quotas
on the total value of financial service transactions, or on the number of
operations and outputs realized by foreign TPP entities.137 Lastly, Chapter
11 ensures that foreign financial services providers are to be covered by the
rules applicable under foreign investment law as provided within the
investment chapter of the TPP,138 including-but not limited to-the
minimum standard of treatment requirement (which includes fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security under customary
international law), the expropriation and compensation requirement, the
freedom of transfers requirement (aimed at guaranteeing the right of
investors to repatriate profits), and a specific investor-state dispute
settlement (ISDS) mechanism, which allows recourse to investor-state
arbitration as provided under Chapter 9.139
2. TTIP
Although rather confidential, the large scale Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP), currently negotiated by the US and the EU,
contains provisions aimed at increasing policy and regulatory cooperation in
financial services.14
First, in Chapter III, the proposed agreement provides for a large "cross-
border supply of services," which guarantees market access to cross-border
service providers (preventing host states from imposing restrictions on the
number of providers allowed into the country, or from imposing quotas and
limitations on the quantity and value of operations and on the entry of
personnel), together with the customary national treatment and MFN
provisions.141 Second, it contains an Annex in the form of two sub-
sections-"Liberalization of Financial Services," and "Regulatory
135. On the contribution of TPP to financial services, see Martin & Mercurio, supra note 90, at
forthcoming.
136. Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 128, at arts. 11.3-11.4.
137. Id. at arts. 11.5, 11.13.
138. Id. at art. 11.2(2) ("Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment) is hereby incorporated into and
made a part of this Chapter.").
139. As protected under Articles 9.6, 9.8, 9.9, and 11.22 of the Investment Chapter, id. at art.
11.
140. See generally Proposal of the EU on the "Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership:
Trade in Services, Investment and E-Commerce," (July 31, 2015), https://goo.gl/IZKLH4.
141. Id. at arts. 3.2-3.4.
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Cooperation in Financial Services,"142 which shows a common willingness to
conduct financial services market liberalization. But this Annex provides
little provisions directly applicable to financial services, and mainly serves to
extend the scope of the agreement of such services, whilst listing the relevant
chapter of the agreement deemed applicable to the sector. Hence, it ensures
that foreign financial service providers are treated according to the rules of
trade in cross-border services (Chapter III) and are recognized as investors
under the rules of foreign investment law (done so by referring to the
investment chapter, Chapter II)-which unlike the vast majority of
investment agreements, also includes a "market access" commitment, which
provides pre-establishment rights.143 But in all, financial services has been a
difficult aspect of the TTIP negotiations because the US was reticent in
cooperating on financial regulations "for fear of weakening various
regulatory initiatives which have been implemented since the financial crisis,
and/or interfering with regulatory initiatives underway in other international
for a," a point deemed essential to the EU.'4
3. CETA
The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between
the EU and Canada is the most palpable mega-agreement to date. Although
it still has to be ratified by Canada, and incorporated in each of the EU
members' domestic legal systems, it was ratified by the EU Parliament on
February 15th 2017,145 and thus is the most practical agreement available.
Like the proposed TITIP text, CETA contains an investment chapter
(Article 8) which includes a market access clause that prevents the hosts from
imposing various restrictions on foreign providers,146 as well as a section on
cross-border trade of services (Article 9). In contrast with the TTIP Annex,
which merely refers to the services and investment chapters to establish a
framework, CETA, however, makes these chapters inapplicable to financial
services.147
142. Id. at art. 5.
143. Id. at art. 3.2; see also UN CONF. ON TRADE AND DEv., BIATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIEs 1995-2006: TRENqDs IN INVEsTMENT RULEMAKING, at 26, U.N. Sales No.
E.06.II.D.16 (2007) (explaining that "an increasing number of BITs provide national treatment
and MFN treatment in the pre-establishment phase," while also noting that, "[s]ummarizing the
recent trends in BITs, the prevailing approach is to make the question of entry and
establishment subject to national laws").
144. See Financial Services Liberalization and TiSA: Implications for EU Free Trade Agreements,
supra note 13, at 11.
145. The full text of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada
(CETA) is available from the page of the Council of the European Union, see 'EU-Canada trade
agreement: Council adopts decision to sign CETA' (28/10/2016), https://goo.gl/vM2lqc.
146. Id.
147. Id. at art. 8.3 ("This Chapter does not apply ... to the extent that the measures apply to
investors or to their investments covered by Chapter Thirteen (Financial Services)."); see also id.
at art. 9.2(2)(d).
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Instead, these are dealt with under a specific article (Financial Services,
Article 13), which like TPP, CETA views financial services as an "investment
playground" and provides the entire regime applicable to the sector by
incorporating selected provisions of Chapter 8. This Chapter includes the
market access provision,148 which together with national treatment and
MFN clauses, both refer to and incorporate the clauses drafted in Chapter 8
for this purpose in the investment chapter.49 Also, provision aimed at
fostering the development of new financial services is provided alongside
regulatory efficiency and transparency obligation.150 Finally, the financial
services chapter incorporates selected standards of international investment
law borrowed to Article 815s-specifically treatment of investors and of
covered investments (Article 8.10), compensation for losses (8.11),
expropriation (8.12), transfers (8.13), and denial of benefits (8.16). In
addition, the article provides foreign providers with an investor-state dispute
resolution system, adapted to ensure financial stability to the host.152
4. TiSA
Finally, it is important to mention the Trade in Services Agreement
(TiSA) which has been in negotiations since 2012 between the EU and
twenty-three countries, known as the "Really Good Friends of Services,"
mainly due to a lack of optimism on Doha Round's ability to deliver on
services.53
TiSA is significant because it will be the first modern FTA to reunite the
EU, the US, and a significant number of WTO members. Hence, it might
provide a convergence opportunity between EU and US approaches to
financial services,154 but in the future, the goal is to allow expending TiSA at
the multilateral level amongst all WTO members.1ss But major countries
148. Id. at art. 13.6-7.
149. Id. at art. 13.4-7.
150. Id. at arts. 13.14, 13.11.
151. Id. at art. 13.2(3).
152. Id. at arts. 13.20-21; see also Martin & Mercurio, supra note 90, at forthcoming.
153. The Plurilateral Agreement on Services, EURoPEAN PARLMENTr July 1, 2013), https://
goo.gl/ChbucZ.
154. Financial Services Liberalization and TiSA: Implications for EU Free Trade Agreements, supra
note 13, at 11.
155. The PlurilateralAgreement on Services, supra note 153, at 14-15 (Explaining, "[t]he objective
of the plurilateral trade in services agreement should be to negotiate an ambitious agreement
that is compatible with the General Agreement on Trade in Services, (GATS), which would
attract broad participation and which could be multilateralised at a later stage. Indeed, by
staying close to the GATS, it could be easier to convince some of the leading emerging
countries that were active in the DDA negotiations to join the initiative, either during the
negotiations or later on.").
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such as China, Russia, or India are not part of the negotiations thus far,
despite these countries having applied.156
The text of the agreement is currently under confidential negotiations,157
but some information is already available. In line with the free-riding fears,
formulated by the US as part of the GATS negotiations, the negotiating
parties-led by the EU158-are pushing the idea that MFN commitments
ought to be excluded from the agreement until the so-called "critical mass"
of ninety percent of global trade services are represented.159 Therefore, until
then, the parties retain the liberty to negotiate more ambitious agreements
without extending those arrangements to other TiSA parties.160 In addition,
as reported by the EU, "unlike most other services agreements, the TiSA has
adopted a hybrid approach to listing: positive listing for market access, and
negative listing for national treatment," which implies that no discrimination
between domestic and foreign services providers would become the norm,
unless expressly excluded.161
The financial services part of the agreement would seem to take the form
of an annex, which includes the main national treatment and regulatory
transparency provisions. It is emphasized, however, that "the EU's proposals
for the TiSA core text and the Annex on Financial Services simply replicate
existing VTO provisions in the GATS, the GATS Annex on Financial
Services, and the GATS Understanding on Commitments in Financial
156. Stephanie Henry, China Expresses Interest in Joining Services Negotiations, Creating New
Opportunities & Ricks, U.S.-CINA Bus. COUNs. (last visited June 26, 2017), https://goo.gi/
12VSPW.
157. Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) Financial Services Annex, WuaLEAKs (June 3, 2015),
https://goo.gl/fxvLF3.
158. Financial Services Liberalization and TiSA: Implications for EU Free Trade Agreements, supra
note 13, at 31 (Stating that "this would constitute a significant, and probably unacceptable,
limitation on the EU's FTA strategy going forward.").
159. As of 2012, TiSA members represented 68.2% of global trade in services, see The
Plurilateral Agreement on Services, supra note 153, at 18-19 (Stating: "[i]n order to avoid free-
riding, the automatic multilateralization of the agreement based on the Most Favored Nation
(MFN) principle should be temporarily suspended as long as there is no critical mass of WTO
members joining the agreement."); see also Financial Services Liberalization and TiSA: Implications
for EU Free Trade Agreements, supra note 13, at 31 ("It is still unsettled whether the TiSA text
will include an MFN provision.").
160. The issue of non-MFN negotiations raises concerns. See, e.g., Malcolm Bosworth, The
Proposed Non-MFN Trade in Services Agreement: Bad for Unilateralism, the WTO and the
Multilateral Trading System, 3 (NCCR Trade Reg., Working Paper No. 2014/05), https://goo.glI/
9691ge. See also Michitaka Nakatomi, Sectoral and Plurilateral Approaches in Services Negotiations:
Before and After TISA, 5 (ECIPE, Policy Brief 02/2015), https://goo.gl/ZzMAO2 (finding that
"there is no rationality in introducing a discriminatory system.").
161. See Financial services liberalization and TiSA: Implications for EU Free Trade Agreements, supra
note 13, at 15.
496 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Services."62 Hence, TiSA would "simply reflect a continuation of the status
quo as far as financial services are concerned."63
A "new financial services" clause seems to be discussed, yet no reference is
made to a potential market access clause, which might appear within a larger
"trade-in-services" chapter. Similarly, while the nature of the applicable
dispute settlement process remains vague, the available draft does not
indicate whether arbitration might be the chosen path. In fact, according to
the EU, "one obvious but significant point of difference between the TiSA
and most new generation FTAs is that . .. TiSA will not contain investment
protections, and related investor-state dispute settlement, in respect of
investments and investors in the financial sector."64
Hence, despite very little information being available, two conclusions
may be formulated. One is that TiSA shows the willingness of the US, the
EU, and of the twenty-three other countries to move forward with services
market liberalization on a wide and futuristic global scale. The other is that
liberalization on financial services might be limited in that there are
expectations that financial services market access commitments will
essentially be compatible with those of GATS. But in the absence of
investment provisions applicable to financial services, the agreement might
have less impact than CETA, or the late TPP which, as mentioned
previously, both included investment chapters capable of picturing financial
services as major investment playgrounds.
D. BUr PREFERENTIALISM IS NOT ABOUT CREATING A GLOBAL
FRAMEwoRK
True to its name, preferentialism has never-and is still not-about
building a global framework for financial services facilitation coordination.
Despite many (overlapping) instruments suggesting a converging willingness
to coordinate cross-border financial services facilitation on a largely selective
basis, identifying comparable liberalization benchmarks has always been
problematic.165 It is difficult to argue that the premise for a generally
applicable legal framework for cross-border financial services coordination
was ever agreed upon.
First, early preferential agreements have not covered financial services
equally. Efforts for preferential agreements particularly occur in relation to
162. Id. at 25. See also Elina Viilup, The Trade in Services Agreement (TISA): An End to
Negotiations in Sight?, EUROPEAN PARukmrr, https://goo.gl/IxQREU.
163. EU reports suggest that while the EU's initial financial services package matched that of
the EU-Korea FTA (which as mentioned previously is described as superseding the
commitments taken in the significant Korea-U.S. FTA), improvements reaching CETA-like
levels of ambition have been discussed while "few if any TPP parties have gone beyond the TPP
package in the TiSA negotiations." See Financial services liberalization and TiSA: Implications for
EU Free Trade Agreements, supra note 13, at 7, 25.
164. See id. at 7.
165. Sen, supra note 97, at 556, 562; Piez, supra note 33, at 1066; Roy et al., supra note 64, at
155.
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the opening of insurance markets; however, no study affirms that a general
and globally applicable framework for banking and non-insurance services
liberalization has been developed. In fact, research focusing on PTAs
between developing countries suggests that preferential arrangements have
aimed at developing reciprocity and at fostering regional integration
(Mercosur, ASEAN) more than at creating a set of legal rules for the
development of cross-border financial services.66 A similar argument could
reasonably hold as far as the modem mega-negotiations are concerned.
Second, large disagreements have suggested that existing preferential
standards could not supersede the authority of (nonexistent) multilateral
rules, once described as "the superior option for carrying out trade
liberalization."67 In addition, it has been noted that RTAs might even "pose
a threat to a balanced development of world trade," by creating parallel and/
or overlapping discriminatory standards (the so-called "noodle bowl") to the
detriment of regulatory transparency while diverting trade and investment
flows from countries not involved-or not capable of getting involved-in
preferential arrangements.16 8 In the context of the ASEAN, for instance, the
WTO had concerns that Singapore's pro-market opening of preferential
trade policies could be detrimental to other economies-such as Malaysia-
while suggesting "that the WTO [was] a weak forum for an open
multilateral trading system."69 Thus, some suggestions were made that
preferential regional commitments ought to be treated as entry level pledges
prior to com ntting at the global level, or that a 'consultative system' could
be built to map, monitor, and redefine preferential rules as to preserve
multilateral talks and interests.170 Again, in sum, a politicized debate prevails
on the possibility to generate a wide framework for the facilitation and
coordination of cross-border trade in financial services.
166. Countries involved in negotiations on the cross-border supply of financial services with
the U.S. have gone beyond the multilateral requirements by adding commitments to the cross-
border supply of insurance intermediation (broking and agency) and to portfolio management
services, by switching from asset management firms to mutual funds. Roy et al., supra note 64,
at 173-75; In this additional research, the authors emphasized that Guatemala's commitments
went from 9 under GATs, to 90 under PTAs; Chile's commitments increased from 10 to 74;
Australia's increased from 47 to 83; Japan went from 45 to 70, etc. However, India and the
European Communities of the ASEAN countries, made limited commitments under PTAs, see
Marchetti & Roy, supra note 97, at 85, 89.
167. Stephenson, supra note 64, at 188, 196, 204; Mattoo and Fink, supra note 99, at 16-19.
168. Adlung, supra note 94, at 8, 19; Crawford, supra note 97, at 1, 16-17; On the gap between
early birds and late movers, ee also Roy, Marchetti and Lim, supra note 64, at 185-87; Mattoo
and Fink, supra note 99, at 4, 20-22; Sen, supra note 97, at 555, 564-65.
169. Thangavelu, supra note 22, at 1214.
170. See, e.g., Crawford & Fiorentino, supra note 97, at 18.
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V. Future Perspectives
Despite the rapidly growing influences and reach of financial services
fostered by modern technology, the perspectives of cross-border facilitation
coordination overall seem limited.
A. LIUTED GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES
First, the global economy has been hit by several impacting and long
lasting financial crises-the Asian crisis of 1997, the Argentinian crisis of
2001, and the worldwide crisis of 2008-and today financial institutions are
under increased scrutiny.171 Hence, the trends suggest that financial services
in the future will be increasingly regulated through international norms such
as Basel I, 11, and III172 because of their potential impact, rather than
facilitated and coordinated.
Second, chances of multilateral-for example global and consensual-
policy and rule-making are slim because no organization-especially not the
VTO-is capable of playing a facilitator role in the matter. On the other
hand, WTO staffers have emphasized that the multilateral system is unable
to cope with the multiplicity of domestic institutional framework, and
concluded that the "centralized" negotiation structures in Geneva failed to
cooperate with the uncoordinated domestic policymaking bodies.173 The
number and intensity of technical meetings at the VTO level declined,
notifications to the V/TO have become irregular, while members are
increasingly reticent to discuss specific commitments with VTO
committees, thus, indicating a general "negotiating fatigue," as well as a
"widespread disregard of long-existing transparency Obligations."174 The
staffers even suggested that the V/TO ought to follow a "more modest
approach," whereby it would not act as a promoter but "predominantly as a
sort of a notary or 'clearing house' to certify and oversee liberalization
moves decided and implemented in whatever other contexts."175 Meanwhile,
the never ending Doha Round, which was long under intensive care, was
"buried" in Nairobi in December 2015, with the adoption of "The Nairobi
Package," and the implicit admission that the international community
171. On the heavy regulation of financial services, see, e.g., Claessens, supra note 83, at 2, 6-7,
16.
172. The idea that financial liberalization would be structured through additional mechanisms,
such as IOSCO or the Basel rules, was also part of the debate near the end of the decade. But
this topic is outside the scope of this paper. For more information on IOSCO or the Basel rules,
see generally Press Release, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Group of Governors and
Heads of Supervision Announces Higher Global Minimum Capital Standards (Sept. 12, 2010)
(on file with author); see also Patrick Slovik, Systemically Impotant Banks and Capital Regulation
Challenges, 9-10 (OECD Economics Department, Working Paper No. 916, 2012).
173. Adlung, supra note 94, at 9.
174. Id. at 20-2.
175. Id. at 8, 11, 20-2.
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would now close negotiations.176 But the WTO has no agenda on financial
liberalization and is incapable of acting as a forum for the development of a
global legal framework for cross-border financial services.
Third, preferential arrangements have become problematic, politically
incorrect, and incorrectly political. Whilst the late 2000s, the idea was that
"self-generated" preferential financial liberalization remained a valuable
option.177 Today, an important shift is taking place. The most visible trade
arrangement since the development of NAFTA-for example the TPP, the
TTIP, the CETA, and the TiSA-are being questioned by all political sides,
if not put to a halt. On the US side, the presidential debate has pushed all
candidates to question the TPP deal,17 while in the EU, national leaders
seem ready to block a treaty deemed excessively beneficial to the US. The
EU often expressed concerns as to the consequences of the Canadian deal,19
thus, sending the message that soon after Brexit, the EU's ability to sign
preferential trade will remain fragile. Hence, the most recent preferential
arrangements, which were once described as the "bilateral renaissance"180 of
trade facilitation, have become -incorrectly -political to the people and
politically incorrect to the decision-makers.
B. TiE US: FROM LEADERSHIP TO UNCERTAINTY
Finally, while the above shows that the EU and the US have historically
played an important leadership role in developing trade in financial services
at plurilateral and regional levels, two important questions emerge as a result
of the arrival of power to President Trump.
The decision to unravel the Dodd-Franck legislation to facilitate financing
in the US is likely to challenge the currently applied international financial
regulations, which have in large part been set up with similar objectives in
mind, for example, increasing the stability of the global financial system by
ensuring that banks do not stand on shallow legs following the 2008
176. See Martin & Mercurio, supra note 90, at 50-55; On the death of the Doha Round, see also
Bryan Mercurio, Reflections on the World Trade Organization and the Prospects for Its Future, ?10
MELB. J. INT'L L. 49, 49-57 (2009).
177. At the time, WTO staffers wrote that "Geneva is distinctly different from Brussels," and
admitted that the WTO would not create a multilateral trading framework like those designed
and implemented at the EU or NAFTA levels. Adlung, supra note 94, at 8, 20-22.
178. See, e.g., Jake Tapper, 45 Times Secretary Clinton Pushed the Trade Bill She Now Opposes,
CNN (June 15, 2015), https.J/goo.gl/K4Q5mP. See also Sam Thielman, Hillary Clinton's U-turn
on TPP Deal has Team Working Overtime Ahead of Debate, GuARDIAN (Oct. 13, 2015), https://
goo.gl/V6FniH.
179. Jennifer Rankin, Doubts Rise over TT7P as France Threatens to Block EU-US Deal, GUARDIAN
(May 3, 2016), https://goo.gl/Ne5u3W. See also Daniela Vincenti, EU Leaders on Collision Course
with Commission over CETA, EuRAcrr (June 30, 2016), https://goo.gl/IEzhbM. See also
Belgium Walloons Block Key EU CETA Trade Deal with Canada, BBC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2016),
https://goo.gl/pyjWzP.
180. Lucian Cernat, TPP, TFIP and Multilateralism: Stepping Stones or Oceans Apart? VOX
(Nov. 8, 2013), https://goo.gl/V6JwU3.
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economic crisis.181 The decision, in addition, comes with the waiving of
financial adviser's obligation to put their clients' best interests first,182 which
overall suggests that a financial services policy would likely be oriented
towards deregulation, rather than coordination in the future. Hence, if
conducted, policymaking might lead to major issues, such as shadow banking
and financial instability, and the international regulatory bodies-which
currently oversee the financial stability preservation processes-might
attempt to counterbalance the US policy shifts. They are, more than ever,
very unlikely to focus on promoting and coordinating modern cross-border
financial services.
Concerning trade policy, dynamics will also change. The decision of
President Trump to withdraw from TPP, and to favor bilateral deals, will
have important consequences, particularly in terms of financial coordination
in leadership.
By preferring bilateralism to regionalism, President Trump has probably
lost a tremendous opportunity to ensure that US-led trade rules will be
applied on a larger scope and has sent the message that Washington will
abandon trade leadership at large.183 Meanwhile, in the Asia-Pacific, the
APEC organization-of which the US is a member-has insisted that
protectionism was not imaginable, warned that liberalization would continue
with or without Washington, and has since become the center of interests of
various US trade partners wanting to commit to more trade facilitation.84
This political positioning by President Trump is likely to have a double
impact on financial services liberalization. Although Washington has not
communicated about TTIP and TiSA projects so far, Washington's TPP
policy suggests that the same path may be followed. In fact, until the 2016
US elections, analysts believed that "the leadership of the United States and
the European Union in the TiSA negotiations [would] continue[ ] to
reinforce the position of these two players as rule-makers and push[]
towards 'global' financial regulatory coordination with their leadership."8s
But the trend has become unlikely. As of February 2017, it would seem that,
if Washington applies its new bilateral policy to TTIP and TiSA, financial
services leadership would evolve without US influence. In fact, in relation to
181. See, e.g., Ben Protess & Julie H. Davis, Trump Moves to Roll Back Obama-Era Financial
Regulations, N.Y. TUEs (Feb. 3, 2017), https://goo.gl/SBuZNC.
182. Stephen Foley & Alistair Gray, Trump Puts Brake on 'Client First' Fiduciary Rule Protecting
Retirees, FrN. TVImEs (Feb. 3, 2017), https://goo.gl/slnmai.
183. In March 2017, commentators suggested that Beijing may seek to replace Washington in
future TPP negotiations. See Nyshka Chandran, After US Drops TPP, China Joins Member States
in Trade Talks, CNBC (Mar. 13, 2017), https://goo.gl/aymzXI; Antoine P. Martin, Trump's TPP
& trade policy will make China politically great again, THE ASIA PACIFIC CIRCLE (Dec. 2, 2016),
https://www.asiapacificcircle.org/single-post/2016/12/02/Trumps-TPP-trade-policy-will-make
-China-great-again-politically.
184. See Antoine Martin, 24th APEC Summit: Shaping the Future of Trade Policy-Making?,
TRADEPACTS (Nov. 29, 2016), https://goo.gl/cCNQOp.
185. Andrew D. Mitchell & Ana Maria Palacio, Coordination in the Asian Financial Markets and
the Case of TISA, 13 MANCHESTER J. OF INT'L EcON. L. 206, 209, 247 (2016).
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TiSA, considering the "critical mass" expectations mentioned previously, a
shift in US influence would even threaten the agreement as a whole. In
relation to TTIP, as mentioned in the previous section, negotiations have
been blocked so far because of financial regulation at large. In contrast with
the EU, the US proved reticent to cooperate by fear of reducing the impact
of the regulations it put into place over the past few years in response to the
financial crisis. Hence, with policies aimed at favoring American priorities
over regional interests, the idea of large-scale financial regulation binding
the US is shrinking and, with it, the likeliness of large-scale modem financial
services facilitation and coordination.
VI. Conclusion
Although the financial services industry is evolving because of rapidly
improving technologies, the global policies and legal framework applicable
to cross-border financial services are currently largely unable to coordinate
forthcoming developments. Even with international bodies largely
committed to regulating and controlling international finance for the sake of
stability, trade negotiations aimed at elaborating facilitation and
coordination dynamics are achieving very limited results.
At the global level, discussions have historically been dominated by
economists who focused on the merits of liberalization, or on the
quantifying of financial service comnuitments taken by states over the years.
But global and preferential financial service negotiations have historically
been marked by detached, dispassionate, and self-interested politics, as well
as by highly selective policymaking efforts. Hence, no global or large-scale
consensus was ever reached on the "basic social rule" for coordinating cross-
border financial services development and facilitation. Of course, the
existing preferential agreements would tend to provide facilitation and
coordination tools for future developments, but they remain largely bilateral
and have little chance of building large-scale dynamics. Furthermore, major
divides have prevailed between developed and developing countries, and the
discourse on financial services liberalization has shifted from economics to
politics, while simultaneously remaning poor in terms of policy-building
and rulemaking. In retrospect, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, financial
services negotiations were essentially a "shop window" political move,
merely motivated by leveraging possibilities, without having many real legal
ambitions or impacts.
In contrast, today large-scale regional instruments could represent
significant tools for developing a forward moving financial service
coordination framework. First, they have the potential for creating regional
dynamics between countries sharing common interest and perspectives.
Second, they also have the potential to start establishing applicable rules
that, in the long-run, might be duplicated and improved as part of additional
initiatives. Yet, because financial services and financial liberalization are seen
as incorrectly political to the people, and politically incorrect to the leaders,
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tools will remain inefficient until policymakers are willing to push the rule-
making further.
Hence, while coordination is needed more than ever, it remains unlikely.
Still, cross-border financial service developments are inevitable and will
sooner or later. Developments need to be planned for in a positive and
forward-moving manner, and must be viewed beyond purely protective
policymaking-particularly given the tendency of innovative financial
service companies who lack familiarity with the financial sector and its
regulations. Until then, modem financial services facilitation will remain in
the realm of voluntarist and unilateral domestic policymaking.
